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This paper addresses the puzzle that public services in some developing countries,
especially in Africa, are poor despite large public expenditure. The intertemporal
model here studies a government’s optimal choice between redistribution and pub-
lic investment. Ethnic diversity and political uncertainty reinforce one another in
producing myopic government behaviour which results in underinvestment. Above
some critical value of political instability, it is optimal for the government not to
invest at all.
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Despite large public expenditure many developing countries, especially in Africa, suﬀer from
poor public services in health, education, infrastructure, etc. (Pradhan, 1996) as well as from
high levels of corruption (Widner, 1999). A theoretical explanation for this puzzle, this paper
relates to three literatures. First, the empirical developing country growth literature hints at
causes, but explanations remain verbal without providing the formal mechanisms. Much of that
literature is reviewed in Collier and Gunning’s ”Why has Africa Grown Slowly?” (JEP, 1999).
Second, more rigourous explanations are few and far between. Robinson and Torvik’s model
in ”White Elephants” (JPubE, 2004) oﬀers such a formal mechanism, but the analysis focuses
on investment while excluding public consumption. Third, the model-theoretic background
for this paper is provided by the public choice literature on political instability, for instance
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (AER, 1992). For all three literatures, the ensuing analysis
can be seen as an extension.
This paper addresses the intertemporal public ﬁnance decision problem of a government (hence-
forth also policymaker) under political instability. In this context, political instability is deﬁned
to comprise both political uncertainty (probability of the incumbent government loosing power
next period) and political polarisation (due to ethnic or social diversity). In a parsimonious
model framework, the incumbent can choose between (eﬃcient) public investment and redis-
tribution from one of two groups in society to the other. Ethnic or social diversity produces
myopic government behaviour, but only if there is at least some political uncertainty at the
same time. For the incumbent government, it is perfectly rational not to invest when beneﬁcial
eﬀects of her policies may not accrue to her in the future. Thus there is underinvestment in
eﬃcient public undertakings. There is, however, a political instability threshold below which
the government is so myopic that it does not want to invest at all. Going above the threshold
leads to a strong increase in public investment, at ﬁrst, because additional political stability
eﬀectively increases the discount factor for the future. However, the additional investment in-
crements (for more and more political stability) become smaller because marginal investment
proﬁtability goes down.
The link to the growth literature is obvious since investment in health, education, infrastructure,
anti-corruption measures, etc. typically creates preconditions for output growth. However,
1Collier and Gunning (1999) explain why this is not always true, especially in Africa. They
argue that ethnic diversity promotes ethnic favouritism, i.e. diverting pubic spending to ethnic
groups instead of creating better conditions for the whole of society. In fact, Easterly and Levine
(1997) ﬁnd that, empirically, ethnic diversity is the most important single cause of slow growth
in Africa. Collier (1999) claims, however, that this is only true in undemocratic countries. By
contrast, this paper argues that social and ethnic diversity exhibits its negative eﬀect only, if
there is political uncertainty at the same time. The government behaves myopically because
loosing power means that the other clan’s or ethnicity’s objectives, not the own, will be realised
next period.1 That is why it is important to study both ethnic diversity and political uncertainty
in one and the same model. Their combined eﬀect on government myopia seems to have been
ignored as a cause of lower investment and growth in the literature thus far.2
In their recent paper ”White Elephants” Robinson and Torvik (2004) oﬀer another theoret-
ical explanation for poor public services. Similar to this paper, there is a rationale for the
government to do what it does. In a 2-period setting, they argue that credible commitment
to an ineﬃcient public investment project raises the incumbent government’s chances to stay
in power.3 They focus exclusively on investment (not public consumption) and address the
(related) puzzle that there is underdevelopment in many developing countries despite a large
amount of investment. They argue that the problem is not underinvestment, but ”extreme
resource misallocation”. In their model, they distinguish between eﬃcient investment projects
and ”projects with a negative social surplus” (which are often prestige projects called ”white
elephants”).4
Some of the main features of this paper are best understood by comparing to Robinson and
Torvik’s (2004) approach. First, eﬃcient public investment is beneﬁcial for everybody in both
1 Notwithstanding the distinction between the characteristics ”undemocratic” and ”political uncertainty”,
there may be a link between the two: autocratic regimes favouring a clan or ethnic group may be more likely
to be overthrown by a government with radically diﬀerent objectives.
2 Another eﬀect of ethnic diversity, more frequent civil wars, was suggested in the literature, but rejected in
a study by Collier and Hoeﬄer (1999) – as quoted in Collier and Gunning (1999).
3 This is so, if the policymaker’s second period loss from the project is smaller than her utility derived from
increased beneﬁts of the project extending to one of the two (ethnic or social) groups in society.
4 Arguably, Robinson and Torvik (2004) oﬀer the most convincing theoretical explanation for white elephants.
For empirical papers on resource misallocation, other theoretical models on white elephants and some striking
historical examples confer their paper.
2papers. However, Robinson and Torvik (2004) also model ineﬃcient public investment projects
which actually serve as a redistribution device. Instead, this paper captures the redistribution
aspect of white elephants more directly by modeling favouritism or tribal aﬃliation in terms of
redistributive public goods which are only beneﬁcial to one of the two groups. However, in both
papers, these groups could be construed as vested interest groups and the redistribution could
also be interpreted as state capture or nepotism. Second, Robinson and Torvik (2004) model
publicly ﬁnanced (eﬃcient or ineﬃcient) private investment projects (like proﬁt or loss-making
manufacturing plants), whereas the concept of eﬃcient public investment in this paper is much
more general. It includes publicly ﬁnanced private investment, but also infrastructural invest-
ment (e.g. building bridges), structural investment (e.g. reorganising governmental structures
or developing new industries) and anti-corruption investment. The latter comprises measures
to improve the protection of property rights or the criminal prosecution of bribery, but does
not include ﬁghting corruption by increasing public consumption (i.e. raising the pay of public
oﬃcials). Irrespective of the type of public investment, it is assumed throughout, that it is
eﬃcient and beneﬁcial to society as a whole.
Third, Robinson and Torvik (2004) consider probabilistic voting, i.e. a vote-maximising gov-
ernment. But white elephants or social/ethnic redistribution do also occur in less democratic
societies with much less predictable causes for a policymaker to loose power. Examples are a
coup d’´ etat, a revolution or a terrorist attack as in Spain in March 2004. These are more or
less exogenous events reﬂecting inherent instability in a country. Therefore, they are captured
by an exogenous probability of loosing power similar to Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini
(1992), Devereux and Wen (1998), Svensson (1998) or Bohn (2000 and 2004). Those papers
represent a strand of the public choice literature which could be termed ”exogenous political
instability”. As in this paper, a parsimonious model framework is used to illustrate the impact
of political instability under various scenarios.5 Alternative aspects of a government’s public
5 Typically, taxation is modeled as simply as possible. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) capture
seigniorage and a structural parameter to show that it is optimal for the government to raise more seigniorage
and refrain from structural reform under political instability. Modeling domestic debt and taxation, the outcome
in Devereux and Wen (1998) is high public activity and low growth. Bohn (2000 and 2004) discusses the (in-
)eﬀectiveness of debt conditionality when foreign debt and seigniorage are alternative sources of revenue. As in
this paper, Svensson (1998) also models public investment, but he interprets it as property rights investment
and studies its impact on private investment.
3ﬁnance decision are considered, but there is a common mechanism: economic outcomes are
determined by myopic behaviour which is caused by inherent political instability.
Sections 2 and 3 present the intertemporal framework of the theoretical model. The government
maximisation problem is summarised and simpliﬁed in sections 4 and 5. Sections 6 and 7
present interior and corner solutions describing the ﬁnding of public underinvestment. Section
8 discusses the signiﬁcance and combined eﬀect of ethnic diversity and political uncertainty.
Section 9 concludes.
2 Government Preferences and Political Instability
The model consists of two periods: period 1 (current period) and period 2 (next period). There
are two sectors in the economy: (i) the government and (ii) the private sector. The model is
speciﬁed in real terms. Government preferences over periods 1 and 2 are given by the following
utility function:
W = V1(C1) + H1(G1,F1) + E{ρ(V2(C2) + H2(G2,F2))}. (1)
The V.(•) functions are concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions of the
government in private sector consumption C. The H.(•) functions are the utility functions in
the government provision of amounts G and F of the two public goods. G is beneﬁcial only for
one of two groups in society and F exclusively for the other. G and F could also be interpreted
as vested interest rents due to state capture. E is the expectation operator and ρ < 1 is the
government’s discount factor. Total government utility is additively separable in two senses:
ﬁrst, with respect to periods; and second, with respect to utility derived either from private
consumption or from public goods provision.
Assuming two types of governments political instability comprises two features: (i) the proba-
bility of government change and (ii) political polarisation. After the ﬁrst period the incumbent
government may loose oﬃce to the other set of policymakers with a ﬁxed probability π; it stays
in power with probability (1 − π).6 Both ethnic or social groups (or, indeed, vested interest
6 In a multi-period setting, this random change of government at ﬁxed intervals would be referred to as
4groups) beneﬁt only from either one of the two public goods. However, each of the two types of
government provides both types of public goods, but to diﬀering degrees. Political polarisation
then depends on the diﬀerences of policymakers’ preferences with respect to their public good
provision. The government utility function H is speciﬁed for one type of government (for the




min{αG,(1 − α)F}. (2)
For simplicity, their disagreement in public goods provision is parameterised symmetrically by
α which is exogenous. The denominator in equation (2) is a normalisation such that the public
goods utility equals the sum total X of spending on both public goods:
H(G,F) = F + G =: X. (3)
Then the marginal public goods utility is unity (confer appendix A). Without limiting the
general validity of the analysis, it is assumed that 1 ≤ α ≤ 1
2. When α equals half, the two types
of government have identical preferences; the more distant α is from half, the more they disagree
on how much to spend on each of the two public goods. If preferences of both policymaker
types are very dissimilar, political polarisation is large. Political polarisation measured by
α contributes to political instability because it accounts for the extend of preference changes
given a change in government. For α equals half, the instability eﬀect of a government change
is eliminated.
3 Budget Constraints
The government budget constraints in real terms for both model periods (1 and 2) are:
I + G1 + F1 ≤ τ ¯ Y . (4)
Markov switching (or Markov chain). If several time periods were considered and their lengths were ﬁxed,
for instance, at six months, some governments would only be in power for half a year, fewer would last for
a year, and fewer yet for any longer period of time. This is a simple way of describing government change,
but it matches the situation in many developing or transition countries. In Russia, for instance, there were
5 changes of government in 1998 and 1999 despite the fact that no Duma or presidential elections were held.
President Yeltsin alternately replaced representatives of the nomenclature (Chernomyrdin, Primakov, Putin)
with so-called reformist Prime Ministers (Kirienko, Stepashin) in arbitrary and irregular intervals.
5G2 + F2 ≤ τY (I).
Government expenditure consists of two kinds: public investment I; and consumptive spending
F and G which is spent on the two types of public goods. To keep the revenue side as simple
as possible, government revenue is modeled at a rudimentary level only. As, for instance, in
Aghion and Bolton (1990) tax revenues are calculated from constant tax rate τ and income
as tax base. The tax rate and ﬁrst period income ¯ Y (an endowment) are exogenous, but
second period income Y (I) depends on public investment I in the previous period. We assume
an increasing function, i.e. eﬃcient investment, but decreasing marginal returns: Y 0(I) > 0,
Y 00(I) < 0. Public investment may be interpreted in terms of standard infrastructure investment
or investment in any type of structural change leading to more eﬃciency and hence higher
private sector production and income levels. It could, however, also be interpreted as publicly
ﬁnanced private investment or anti-corruption measures with similar eﬀects on production and
income.7
The private sector budget constraints in real terms for both periods are simply:
C1 ≤ (1 − τ)¯ Y . (5)
C2 ≤ (1 − τ)Y (I).
Each period real private consumption depends on real income net of non-distortionary taxes.
The model could be interpreted in per capita terms, but the private sector is passive in the
sense that it cannot take optimising decisions on labour, savings or private investment. Thus,
the two private sector budget constraints are not directly linked intertemporally. In that regard
the model is similar to the model in Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). Income growth
is only generated by public investment, not by private sector activity. These assumptions allow
us to focus on the government and its decision problem. They may be justiﬁed in two ways:
ﬁrst, this is a short run model; and, second, growth in developing countries is not so much
7 The latter interpretation requires the assumption that corruption does always have a negative eﬀect on
output as conﬁrmed in convincing empirical studies by Mauro (1995), M´ eon and Sekkat (2004) and others, but
previously contested by Huntington (1968), Lui (1985), Beck and Maher (1986), Lien (1986) and others. The
vicious cycle of corruption and slow growth is captured theoretically in Mauro (2004).
6determined by the private sector, but more by other factors like (infra-) structural or other
public investment (as modeled here) or foreign direct investment (which is not captured in the
model). As there is no private investment in the model, the terms ”public investment” and
”investment” are henceforth used interchangeably.
4 Government Maximisation Problem
As shown in appendix A, the government has two types of instruments to increase its utility:
public investment in period 1 and public spending on each of the two public goods in both
periods. Increasing this period’s public spending raises contemporaneous public goods utility H.
Higher investment this period increases future private sector income (and thereby private sector
utility) as well as tax revenues (and thereby public goods spending and utility) in the following
period. In principle, there is private consumption smoothing because private consumption
utility is concave. However, the amount of smoothing depends on the eﬀective discount factor
(which also includes the eﬀect of political instability as shown in equation 8) and how proﬁtable
public investment is (i.e. the shape of the Y (I) function). These factors also determine the
intertemporal distribution of public goods spending, even though its utility is unity in both
periods due to the assumption made in equation (2).
The government decision problem is made tractable because of three assumptions: (i), public
goods spending F and G does not appear in the private sector budget constraints (5); (ii),
government objective function (1) is additively separable; (iii), the functional format of the
polarisation assumption embedded in equation (2) guarantees H(G,F) = F + G (equation
3). Due to assumptions (i) and (ii) the government optimisation problem can be decomposed
into two problems: ﬁrst, the optimal distribution of the total public goods spending between
F and G (distribution problem); and second, the fundamental revenue and expenditure
problem of the government (fundamental problem). The (optimal) distribution problem is
not really interesting since its results hinge on speciﬁc (though quite sensible) assumptions for
public goods utility H (assumption (iii)). Indeed, the mathematical solution of the distribution
problem for public goods spending (confer appendix A) is only required for being able to solve
the fundamental revenue and expenditure problem of the government. Due to assumption
7(iii) the fundamental problem of the government is independent of the actual government in
power (see next paragraph). Nonetheless, the fact that there are two potential governments
does have crucial implications for any government decision on the total amount of public goods
spending as well as on public investment. In fact, the model is constructed that way to allow
for the analysis of political instability by itself (as, for instance, in Devereux and Wen (1998)
or Svensson (1998)) as opposed to analysing the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of government with
diﬀerent objectives (as, for instance, in Aghion and Bolton (1990) or Tabellini and Alesina
(1990)).
We proceed as follows. In the next paragraph, the solution for the optimal public goods
distribution problem is used to simplify total government utility and, thereby, make the
government maximisation problem tractable. Then both the interior and the corner solution
for the fundamental problem of government revenue and expenditure are discussed.
5 Simplifying Total Government Utility
As shown in appendix A, aforementioned assumption (iii) (equation 6), which refers to the
functional format of utility function H, has three speciﬁc implications. First, the optimal
distribution of the total partial interest spending between F and G is crosswise symmetrical
for both types, say i and k, of governments (when in power). Second, government utility H
derived from type i’s choice of F and G (when in power) is equal to government utility derived














In either case, the marginal utility of public goods spending is unity. Third, the (real) total value
of public goods spending H is normalised - for each government - by the sum of its arguments
(F + G), when chosen optimally by any incumbent government. For i and k representing
diﬀerent governments and α > 1
2 being assumed (without loss of generality), note, however,
that government k’s optimal choice for F and G is, of course, suboptimal for government i:
Xi = Hi(Gi,F i) > Hi(Gk,F k) = 1−α
α Xi.
8On this basis, the government utility function (1), can be simpliﬁed. For each period separately,
utility derived from private consumption and from partial interest spending is considered for
the government in power in period 1 only. Superscripts are only used for the other government
(marked by k). In period 1, this government’s optimal choice for F and G results in H(G1,F1) =
X1. Thus ﬁrst period utility is
V (C1) + H(G1,F1) = V (C1) + X1 (7)
If this government is still in power in period 2 (with probability (1 − π)), it will choose F
and G such that H(G2,F2) = X2. If, however, this government looses power in period 2 (with
probability π), it has to put up with the public goods spending chosen by the other government,
i.e. H(Gk
2,F k
2 ) = 1−α
α X2. Hence its second period total expected utility is:
E { ρ ( V (C2) + H(G2,F2) )} (8)
= ρ






= ρ ( V (C2) + β(α,π)X2 )
Thus government utility in period 2 depends on the eﬀective discount factor which comprises
three exogenous parameters: discount factor ρ, political polarisation α and the probability of
loosing power π. The latter two parameters are subsumed under quasi-exogenous parameter β,
which is to represent political instability:




Note that political instability augments the eﬀect of the discount factor: it lowers the valuation
for the second period, i.e. it increases government myopia. Obviously, β = 1 if both govern-
ments have identical preferences (α = 1
2) or if the government stays in power with certainty
(π = 0). For α = 1 and π = 1, β = 0. In other words, β decreases with more political diversity
(polarisation α ↑) and/or more political uncertainty (probability of government change π ↑).
96 Interior Solution
The fundamental revenue and expenditure problem of the government can now be speciﬁed on
the basis of government preferences as stated in (1) and equations (7) and (8). Government
budget constraints (4) and private sector budget constraints (5) can be substituted into equa-
tions (7) and (8) for Xt and Ct, t = 1,2, respectively. Then the government objective function
is:
max
I V ((1 − τ)¯ Y ) + τ ¯ Y − I + ρV ((1 − τ)Y (I)) + ρβ(α,π)τY (I) (10)
The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) with respect to the (remaining) policy variable I is as follows:
−1 + ρV
0((1 − τ)Y (I))((1 − τ)Y
0(I)) + ρβ(α,π)τ Y
0(I) = 0 (11)
The FOC requires that the marginal utility of (giving up 1 unit of) public good provision in
period 1 (which is unity due to assumption 2 on public goods utility H) must be equal to the
marginal utility derived from (i) additional second period consumption (due to the after-tax
income eﬀect of increased investment) and (ii) additional public goods provision in period 2
(due to the tax eﬀect of increased investment). Note that the discount rates for marginal
utilities (i) and (ii) are diﬀerent. As for (i), marginal utility V 0 is discounted by discount
factor ρ. As for (ii), unity marginal utility of the public goods provision is discounted by ρβ
(because the valuation of the public goods provision in period 2 is diﬀerent for the two types
of policymakers).
The FOC is, of course, only a necessary condition. The suﬃcient condition for a maximum is
that the second derivative of (10) must be negative. In appendix B, it is shown that this is only
true for β above a threshold value, β > β∗, where β∗ is the value for which the second derivative
equals 0. Ultimately, we are interested in the perturbation eﬀect of political instability β on
optimal public investment I. Remember that political instability parameter β introduced in
equation (8) represents both the probability of government change π and political polarisation
α. Remember also that both π and α are negatively related to β, which takes values between
0 (complete instability) and 1 (perfect stability). Assuming now that (10) is a well-deﬁned
maximisation problem (i.e. β > β∗), applying total diﬀerentials leads to
10Proposition 1 (Interior Solution)







Appendix C outlines the derivation of proposition 1. Point (i) states that increasing β, i.e. less
political instability, at the equilibrium leads to more public investment (as long as β > β∗). As
the government becomes less myopic, it is optimal to invest more into the future. Additional
political stability eﬀectively increases the discount factor for the future. This is intuitive and
straightforward. However, point (ii) of proposition 1 asserts that the (positive) marginal eﬀect
on investment of more political stability decreases. This is so because the marginal investment
proﬁtability goes down. Conversely, proposition 1 means that a marginal increase in political
instability at the equilibrium leads to a depletion of public investment which accelerates for
higher values of instability (up to β∗).
7 Corner Solution
For two reasons, this is not the full story: ﬁrst, β could be smaller than β∗; and second, public
investment cannot be reduced at an ever increasing rate for increasing political instability
(β decreased). The rest of the story is simple. For β below β∗, public investment must be
zero. To see this consider the government’s optimal choice problem for β < β∗. Formally,
the government problem becomes a minimisation problem as the second order condition turns
positive. If, however, public investment is constrained to zero in this two period model, the
optimal choice of the government is the corner solution.
Proposition 2 (Corner Solution)
For β < β∗, it is optimal for the government not to invest.
The proposition appears obvious from ﬁrst inspection of the problem, but can be formally
proved by using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The intuition is also simple. For small β, the
11government values the present much more than the future. Given such myopia, the government
does not want to move resources from today to tomorrow. Hence there is no investment. In
the real world, disinvestment (like the sale of infrastructure, e.g. train coaches) might actually
result from large myopia.
The perturbation results could be summarised in two graphs depicting the optimal values for
I and its derivative as a function of β for its entire range (0 ≤ β ≤ 1). For small values of β,
optimal I and dI
dβ are zero. However, from β = β∗ onwards, it is optimal for the government to
invest more and more for increasing β. Optimal I is continuous, but non-diﬀerentiable at β∗.
It is concave thereafter. For dI
dβ, there is a discontinuity at β = β∗. It jumps to inﬁnity and
decreases thereafter, but remains positive .
8 Ethnic Diversity versus Political Uncertainty
So far, the probability of loosing power (political uncertainty π) and social/ethnic diversity
(measured by political polarisation α) were subsumed by the parameter for political stability,
β (where β is inversely related to its underlying parameters and β = 1 means total stability).
This was convenient for the mathematical derivation of the two propositions. To further exploit
the ﬁndings, it is, however, useful to disentangle α and π, the components of β. We proceed in
two steps: ﬁrst, we study their marginal eﬀect on β; and second, we interpret the propositions
in terms of ethnic diversity and political uncertainty.












We already know from section 5 that there is a negative marginal eﬀect of π on β, unless α = 1
(when
∂β
∂π = 0). However, equation (12) also shows that the negative marginal eﬀect increases in
α. Remember that lower β (more political instability) reduces the discount factor, which means
more myopia. Thus more social/ethnic diversity accelerates the eﬀect of political uncertainty
12on government myopia. According to equation (13), the reverse is also true: more political
uncertainty magniﬁes the impact of social/ethnic diversity on myopic government behaviour.
In terms of our ﬁnding that increasing government myopia leads to more and more dramatic
reductions in public investment, we can now interpret the underlying causes. If the government
faces some chance of loosing power and there is some social/ethnic diversity, then an increase in
either of them exacerbates the shortfall of public investment. The eﬀect is, however, magniﬁed,
if both of them deteriorate at the same time. Then, the negative eﬀect on marginal investment
becomes dramatic. This is so, until the political instability threshold β∗ is reached. When that
happens, a rational government chooses not to invest at all, because second period beneﬁts
from investment are discounted too heavily.
9 Conclusion
This paper captures the government decision problem between eﬃcient public investment and
redistribution in a parsimonious model of political instability. The chance of another gov-
ernment being in power and taking undesirable decisions in the future produces a negative
spill-over onto today’s government. This is the basis for the result of myopic government be-
haviour in the literature. In this paper, it is actually optimal for the current government to
totally refrain from spending on public investment, if enough myopia is produced by political
instability. As we increase political stability, we reach a threshold above which it is optimal
to increase investment. At ﬁrst, marginal investment is strong, because additional political
stability eﬀectively increases the discount factor for the future. Then, however, the additional
investment increments become smaller, because marginal investment proﬁtability goes down.
Political instability has two causes: social or ethnic diversity and political uncertainty about
the future government. Loosely speaking, their eﬀect on government myopia is multiplicative.
According to the model, underinvestment in infrastructure, health, or education is particularly
severe in a country with a legacy of ethnic strife combined with a history of coup d’´ etats or
revolutions. Therefore, the paper oﬀers an explanation for appalling levels of eﬃcient public
investment in some developing countries, especially in Africa.
13However, the model results may also be interpreted, more speciﬁcally, as a rationalisation of
governments’ unwillingness to invest in the ﬁght against corruption. Social/ethnic diversity
and political uncertainty combined produce so much myopia that it is rational for governments
not to engage in anti-corruption investment, even if policymakers do not directly beneﬁt from
corruption. If interpreted in this way, it is important to note that the negative transmission
of corruption on output or growth is not modeled here.8 It is, however, assumed implicitly,
that corruption has an overall negative impact on growth.9 Hence public investment directed
at ﬁghting corruption is modeled to have a positive eﬀect on output.
For several reasons, the modeling approach is particularly relevant for certain developing coun-
tries. First, political uncertainty in some of these countries is inherent to the political structure
of the country rather than caused by electoral uncertainty as in Western democracies. Sec-
ond, the disregard for private sector decisions on labour, consumption and investment would
certainly not be suitable simpliﬁcations for industrialised countries, but may be seen as a ﬁrst
approximation in some developing countries, where there is either no economic growth or it
depends on external factors (like foreign direct investment).
However, relaxing these assumptions oﬀers scope for future research, whereas going empirical
may proof impossible, because eﬃcient and ineﬃcient investment would have to be disentangled.
As for theoretical modeling, it may be worth while exploring if there are any trade-oﬀ eﬀects
when other sources of government revenue are included. Another possible extension would
be to model the eﬀect of public investment on growth, when the private sector optimises its
investment and consumption decisions. A further extension might be to capture the interaction
between growth and political instability. It is obvious, that better economic conditions reduce
the chance of, say, a revolution. For many developing countries, it is more appropriate to capture
the feedback of government actions on growth and political instability instead of modeling the
interaction between government decisions and voting.10
8 There are many alternative explanations. For instance, Mauro (1995) contends that red tape occasions
bribes and hampers private investment. Hillman and Krausz (2004) argue, more speciﬁcally, that corruption is
particularly damaging in reducing ﬁnancial intermediation, if the bribe has to be paid upfront irrespective of
the success of a private investment project.
9 Mauro (1995) and M´ eon and Sekkat (2004) show convincingly that corruption does not ”grease the wheel”,
even if there is a lot of regulation in the economy.
10 For instance, Robinson and Torvik (2004) use probabilistic voting, whereas Tabellini and Alesina (1990)
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16A Optimal Public Goods Spending
The following exposition draws on Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). The same
approach is also used in Svensson (1998). For convenience, polarisation assumption (2) which















As the utility function H for the type k government is symmetrical according to its deﬁnition
in section 2, so is the optimal distribution between F k and Gk: (1 − α)Gk = αF k.











By reinserting into utility function (A-1) the optimal values for F and G in terms of X (Gi =














We can now see that the denominator in equation (A-1) was chosen as a normalisation such
that the marginal public goods utility is unity. Furthermore, given that utility function (A-1)
is symmetrical for both types of government, the optimal values for F and G are crosswise










iB Second Order Condition
For (10) to be a well-speciﬁed maximisation problem, the second derivative with respect to I
must be smaller or equal to 0:
ρ ∗ V
00((1 − τ)Y (I)) ∗ ((1 − τ) ∗ Y
0(I))
2 (B.1)
+ ρ ∗ V
0((1 − τ)Y (I)) ∗ ((1 − τ) ∗ Y
00(I)) (B.2)



























τ ∗ β(α,π) − (1 − τ) ∗ V





A suﬃcient condition for this to hold is:
τ ∗ β(α,π) ≥ (1 − τ) ∗ V
0((1 − τ)Y (I)). (B.4)
Given that the marginal utility of H is normalised at unity, the condition could be rewritten
as:
τ ∗ β(α,π) ∗ H
0(G2,F2) ≥ (1 − τ) ∗ V
0((1 − τ)Y (I)). (B.5)
If we ignore the tax rate for a moment (set τ = .5), condition (B.4) requires the eﬀective
marginal public goods utility in period 2, β ∗ H0
2, to be greater or equal to second period
marginal private sector utility V 0
2. Given some political instability (β < 1) this means that,
at the margin, the policymaker must attribute less importance to private consumption than to
total public goods provision.
Equation (B.2) does, however, hold for weaker conditions as well. The marginal private sector
utility V 0
2 could also be greater than the eﬀective marginal public goods utility β ∗ H0
2, as long
iias β ∗ H0
2 is suﬃciently close to V 0
2. For V 0
2 above (but close to) unity, β must be relatively
close to 1, where 1 signiﬁes perfect political stability (no polarisation and/or no chance of
government change). For V 0
2 below unity, the following holds: the farther V 0
2 from unity (i.e.
the less important private consumption is relative to public consumption), the more political
instability is permitted.
In fact, equality in (B.2) deﬁnes β∗, a threshold level for β. For β > β∗ the government choice
problem (10) is a well-deﬁned maximisation problem producing an interior solution for the
optimal level of public investment I.
C Perturbation Results











ρ ∗ τ ∗ Y
0(I)
∂WI
∂I | {z }
−
> 0 (C.1)
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(−ρ ∗ τ ∗ Y
0(I) ∗ ρ ∗ τ ∗ Y
00(I))
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< 0 (C.2)
iii